

Approved For Release 2006/08/21 : CIA-RDP01-01773R000300020001-9

/ Smith as DCI

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SECRET

27 Feb 1953

Dulles is asked, immediately after being sworn in as DCI, to appear before Jt comm on Atomic Energy, altho the comm. has not yet selected a chairman. CIA officers urge Dulles to wait for the appointment of a chairman so as not "to open himself to the line of questioning regarding intell sources and methods which had been held in abeyance through agreements bet. Gen. Smith and Sen. [sic] McMahon."

SECRET

5 Feb 1953

in discussion w/ staff director of one of the Senate
comms, Pforz allows him to read certain documents in
Pforz's presense but refused to release these documents,
explaining that CIA "was always reluctant to make written
material available for reasons of security, and while there
was no immediate security prob involved in this case, I
did not wish to set a prececent by leaving any material
w/ him."

SECRET

Pforzheimer Memo for the Record, 15 March 1952

in Jan 1952, Jt Comm on Atomic E urged the chairman to press CIA for data on which the CIA reached its conclusions in its semi-annual reports on the Sov atomic e. program. Sen. McMahon rejected this request.

McMahon did suggest that if necessary, a subc omm of 3 could be established, but this was opposed by some members, including Sen. Clinton Anderson, who felt that all members of the Comm were entitled to all info.

since our briefing of McMahon and staffer Wm Borden, these 2 are both sincerely opposed to disclosing our sources of info. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that the Comm. has recently been getting info on the US stockpile. This info has been very closely held and has not leaked on the Hill. This increases the Comm's desire to secuire the desired info from us.

Nevertheless, McMahon still feels CIA should not be Qed regarding its basic data

a not atypical week for OLC; Mar. 31-April 4, 1952

1. Met w/ officials of the Civil Service Commission to discuss special security probs raised by the Performance Rating Act of 1950.
 2. discussed possible changes in the Displaced Persons Act.
 3. interagency meeting to consider proposed changes in the Mutual Security Act., w/ a followup meeting the following day.
 4. dealing w/ a request from Jt. Comm. on Atomic E. requesting detailed info on the scope of CIA atomic energy intell activities.
 5. discussion w/ State Dept re a request from Sen. Knowland for info on a Soviet defector. Plus consultation w/ other Agency officers and a phone call to member of Knowland's staff.
 6. meeting w/ members of Senate Judiciary Comm staff re National Committee for Free Europe.
 7. Discussion w/ Sen. McCarran, followed by meeting w/ members of his staff, re John P. Davies affair.
 8. Discussion w/ official from BOB re CIA stand on a House Resolution pertaining to continuation of ~~the~~ a legal state of emergency
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STAT

Comm to take no further action in these cases as it might
dry up a valuable source of info. Comm. immediately agreed
to drop all further investigation.

Senate passes S. 927, amending Sec. 6 of CIA Act, on 11 April 51
(retired officers bill)

House passed S. 927 on 21 May 1951

Senate approved House amendments on 20 June

5 Feb 1951

Jt Cong. Comm on At Energy has requested further info pertaining to our semi-annual report to the Comm. CIA replied that it preferred Sen. McMahon coming to CIA HQs to be privately briefed on info of the highest security classification which could not be testified to before the full comm. McMahon apprehensive of this approach as it gave the appearance of playing too closely w/ the Exec. Branch, and that it would be preferable for DCI to testify generally and refuse to answer such Qs as security would not permit.

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P.L. 53, 82nd Cong., approved June 26, 1951

amends sec. 6 of 1949 act by adding a special provision authorizing
CIA to employ up to 15 retired mil. officers

text of: 65 Statutes-at-Large 89-90

TOP SECRET

Bedell Smith to Robert A. Lovett (Dep Sec/Def), may 21, 1951

in connection w/ MacArthur hearings, Senate ArmSerComm asked
for all CIA reports concerning Korea bet June 1, 1950 and
Apr 1, 1951.

Smith refused to allow this material to go to Cong, and Sen.
Saltonstall w/drew his request for the CIA reports.
Smith based his refusal on his duty to protect sources and
methods.

CONFIDENTIAL

Pforzheimer Memo for the Director, 27 June 1951, Subj: Employees
~~engaged in non-personnel work~~ engaged in personnel work

rider to appropriations bill for f.y. 52 provides that employees engaged in personnel work should be on the ratio of 1 to 115 employees in non-personnel work.

But CIA has special needs and requires types of personnel people other agencies do not need. For instance, CIA does its own personnel procurement, where as other agencies rely on Civil Service.

Personnel also does security work, which is outside the scope of normal personnel programs. also details relating to covert employees.

thus, this provision is inequitable to CIA, and we should seek exemption

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Staffer George Harvey

Job 60-321, box 1

SECRET--SECURITY INFORMATION

Pfaffman Memo for Charles Hubick, 13 Nov. 51,

Harvey - chief clerk, House Appropriations Comm.

Harvey "is one of the best friends this Agency has." If he is properly filled in, he "will do everything he can to try to steer s away from CIA and avoid embarrassing matters coming up." CIA personnel "can feel quite free to tell Mr. Harvey exactly what Qs we wish to avoid, and he can be absolutely assured of Mr. Harvey's integrity and discretion."

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UNCLASSIFIED

Bedell Smith to Carl Vinson, Feb 20, 1951

re legislation authorizing CIA to hire certain retired mil. officers

[I believe this passed c. May 18, 1951]

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28 June 1952--a review of Senate Appro Comm report on Defense Appros indicates that certain cuts had been made vs. CIA. [redacted] and I talked w/ Sen. O'Mahoney, who stated that the overall budget was out of bal and therefore had to be cut, and that CIA must take a cut w/ all other agencies; that he and Sen. Ferguson had meant to call on DCI for testimony but had run out of time; that the Lattimore story had not helped; and that we would therefore just have to absorb this cut, which amts. to approxi. 27% of the budget. STAT

30 June 1952 -- Col. White, [redacted] and I discussed the Senate budget cut w/ DCI and recommended that he call congressman Mahon. I pted out that inasmuch as our original request was a valid one, we could not let a substantial cut go by w/out a protest as it would indicate that we could readily absorb such a cut and had in effect padded our budget. "The DCI stated that he would call Congressman Mahon, at which time he would also ask for permission to utilize certain funds for air-conditioning." STAT

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1 July 1952 -- [redacted] and I talked w/ Mahon re reduction in CIA budget. We stated that we were anxious to hold the cut to bet. 15 and 18% and that anything above that figure might jeopardize our ability to handle emergency factors. Mahon agreed to attempt to restore part of the cut. STAT

I handed Sen. O'Mahoney DCI's letter requesting that a portion of the cut made by the Senate be restored. O'Mahoney plans to discuss it w/ Mahon in an attempt to restore part of the funds. STAT

4 and 5 July -- on both days I spent considerable time at the Capitol in connection w/ CIA appropriations. As a result, the cut on CIA budget has been reduced from approxi 27% to 15%.

12 f2 pp

16 June 1952

the Indep. Offices Subcomm of the House Appro Comm has requested that CIA testify on the Soviet atomic energy program. I informed Subcomm chairman Thomas that CIA most reluctant to testify re the appropriations of another agency, and that all the available intell on the Sov atomic program had been given to AEC. Thomas insisted that CIA appear, so Dulles and Becker appeared before the subcomm and stated why they could not testify "in view of the precedent established regarding CIA non-appearances." The comm. was "adamant" and proposed to go into the matter further w/ the DCI and possibly on the Floor.

20 June -- [] and I talked w/ George Harvey, STAT
clerk of House Appro Comm, re Thomas's demand for testimony from CIA. See my memo to Acting DCI this date.

SECRET

Smith knew how to charm potentially hostile congressmen. At one briefing, Sen. Brien McMahon wanted to know how Smith knew a certain bit of info. Becuz of the sensitive nature of the source, Smith refused to divulge that info but invited McMahon out to HQ for a private briefing. Later, after his formal briefing by a host of CIA people, Smith dramatically dismissed all his staff and talked alone to McMahon. Regardless of what he was told, McMahon not surprisingly got the impressions that he was being let in on all the secrets.. Smith used this same technique on others as well.

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Smith's relations w/ cong. leaders characterized by a strong mutual respect, rather than by warmth. He was generally deferential, responsive, and soldierly, altho he did practice showmanship on them occasionally.

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sometimes, when Cong. Qued him more closely than he wanted, he would divert attention from the subj by saying, "Now, as I recall, Marshall Stalin ~~xxxx~~ once told me" That always drew attention away from the subject at hand.

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as of Apr 1951, NIEs distributed to the following on a routine basis: IAC agencies Pres
A. Harriman, HST's security affairs assis NSC staff
Sec of State and his Policy Planning Staff
Sec of Def and the 3 dept service secs
JCS and certain of its staff Munitions Bd
Research and Development Board Nat. War College
Armed Forces Staff College Nat. Security Resources Board
AEC Office of Defense Mobilization
plus senior diplo. officers and mil commanders were customarily sent estimates thru their departmental HQs in D.C.

finally, the Br. Jt. Intelligence Bureau was sent NIEs unless IAC specifically excepted them

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one request for an estimate from Cong. can be identified for the 1951-52 period. In Jan. 1951, the Jt. Congressional Comm on Atomic E. asked for an estimate on certain Sov. defenses vs. atomic attack.

Ultimately the request was denied, not becuz of CIA or IAC objections, but becuz it was to be based partly on certain US operational planning info which the Sec of Def. declined to reveal to the Cong.

so as far as we can tell (and our records are incomplete), the CIA did not furnish Cong with any estimates in 1951 or 52 originating from cong. sources themselves.

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